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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of loan market competition on the interest rates applied by 
euro area banks to loans and deposits during the 1994-2004 period, using a novel measure 
of competition called the Boone indicator. We find evidence that stronger competition 
implies significantly lower spreads between bank and market interest rates for most loan 
market products. Using an error correction model (ECM) approach to measure the effect of 
competition on the pass-through of market rates to bank interest rates, we likewise find that 
banks tend to price their loans more in accordance with the market in countries where 
competitive pressures are stronger. Further, where loan market competition is stronger, 
we observe larger bank spreads (implying lower bank interest rates) on current account and 
time deposits. This would suggest that the competitive pressure is heavier in the loan 
market than in the deposit markets, so that banks compensate for their reduction in 
loan market income by lowering their deposit rates. We observe also that bank interest 
ratesin more competitive markets respond more strongly to changes in market interest rates. 
These findings have important monetary policy implications, as they suggest that measures 
to enhance competition in the European banking sector will tend to render the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism more effective.   
 
JEL classification: D4, E50, G21, L10. 
Keywords: Monetary transmission, banks, retail rates, competition, panel data. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper discusses the effects of bank competition on bank loan and deposit rate levels as 
well as on their responses to changes in market rates and, hence, on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. Given the prominent role of the banking sector in the euro area’s 
financial system, it is of significant importance for the ECB to monitor the degree of 
competitive behaviour in the euro area banking market. A more competitive banking market 
is expected to drive down bank loan rates, adding to the welfare of households and 
enterprises. Further, in a more competitive market, changes in the ECB’s main policy rates 
supposedly will be more effectively passed through to bank interest rates. 
This study extends the existing empirical evidence, which suggests that the 
degree of bank competition may have a significant effect on both the level of bank rates and 
on the pass-through of market rates to bank interest rates. Understanding this pass-through 
mechanism is crucial for central banks. However, most studies that analyse the relationship 
between competition and banks’ pricing behaviour apply a concentration index such as 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as a measure of competition. We question the 
suitability of such indices as measures to capture competition. Where the traditional 
interpretation is that concentration erodes competition, concentration and competition 
may instead increase simultaneously when competition forces consolidation. For example, 
in a market where inefficient firms are taken over by efficient companies, competition may 
strengthen, while the market’s concentration increases at the same time. In addition, 
the HHI suffers from a serious weakness in that it does not distinguish between small and 
large countries. In small countries, the concentration ratio is likely to be higher, precisely 
because the economy is small. 
The main contribution of this paper is that it applies a new measure for competition, 
called the Boone indicator [see also Boone (2001); Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008); 
Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007)]. The basic notion underlying this indicator is that in a 
competitive market, more efficient companies are likely to gain market shares. Hence, the 
stronger the impact of efficiency on market shares is, the stronger is competition. Further, 
by analyzing how this efficiency-market share relationship changes over time, this approach 
provides a measure which can be employed to assess how changes in competition affect the 
cost of borrowing for both households and enterprises, and how it affects the pass-through 
of policy rates into loan and deposit rates. 
Our study contributes also to the pass-through literature in the sense that it applies 
a newly-constructed data set on bank interest rates for eight euro area countries covering the 
January 1994 to March 2006 period. We include data for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.1 Further, we consider four types of loan products 
(mortgage loans, consumer loans and short and long-term loans to enterprises) and two 
types of deposits (time deposits and current account deposits). We apply recently developed 
dynamic panel estimates of the pass-through model. Our approach is closely related to that 
of Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006), on which it expands by linking the degree of competition 
directly to the pass-through estimates. 
                                                                          
1. For other euro area countries we had insufficient data to estimate the Boone indicator. 
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Against this background, we test the following three hypotheses: 
I) Are loan interest rates lower, and are deposit interest rates higher, in more competitive 
loan markets than in less competitive loan markets? 
II) Are long-run loan and deposit interest rate responses to corresponding market rates 
stronger in more competitive loan markets than in less competitive loan markets? 
III) Do bank interest rates in more competitive markets adjust faster to changes in market 
interest rates than in less competitive markets? 
 
This paper uses interest rate data that cover a longer period and that are based on 
more harmonised principles than those used by previous pass-through studies for the euro 
area. We find that stronger competition implies significantly lower interest rate spreads for 
most loan market products, as we expected. Using an error correction model (ECM) 
approach to measure the effect of competition on the pass-through of market rates to bank 
interest rates, we likewise find that banks tend to price their loans more in accordance with 
the market in countries where competitive pressures are stronger. Furthermore, where loan 
market competition is stronger, we observe larger spreads between bank and market interest 
rates (that is, lower bank interest rates) on current account and time deposits. Lower time 
deposit rates in countries with stronger bank competition are confirmed by the ECM 
estimates. Apparently, the competitive pressure is heavier in the loan market than in the 
deposit markets, so that banks under competition compensate for their reduction in loan 
market income by lowering their deposit rates. Furthermore, in more competitive markets, 
bank interest rates appear to respond more strongly and sometime more rapidly to changes 
in market interest rates. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on both 
measuring competition and the bank interest rate pass-through. Section 3 describes the 
Boone indicator of competition and Section 4 the employed interest rate pass-through model 
of the error-correction type and the applied panel unit root and cointegration tests. Section 5 
presents the various data sets used. The results on the various tests and estimates of the 
spread model and the error correction model equations are shown in Section 6. Finally, 
Section 7 summarises and concludes. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Measuring competition 
Competition in the banking sector has been analysed by, amongst other methods, measuring 
market power (i.e. a reduction in competitive pressure) and efficiency. A well-known approach 
to measuring market power is suggested by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), recently used 
by Bikker (2003) and Uchida and Tsutsui (2005). They analyse bank behaviour on an 
aggregate level and estimate the average conjectural variation of banks. A strong conjectural 
variation implies that a bank is highly aware of its interdependence (via the demand equation) 
with other banks in terms of output and prices. Under perfect competition, where output price 
equals marginal costs, the conjectural variation between banks should be zero, whereas a 
value of one would indicate monopoly. 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) propose an approach based on the so-called H-statistic 
which is the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to the input 
prices. In principle, this H-statistic ranges from -∞ to 1. An H-value equal to or smaller than 
zero indicates monopoly or perfect collusion, whereas a value between zero and one provides 
evidence of a range of oligopolistic or monopolistic types of competition. A value of one 
points to perfect competition. This approach has been applied to all (old) EU countries by 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) and to 101 countries by Bikker et al. (2006). 
A third indicator for market power is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which 
measures the degree of market concentration. This indicator is often used in the context of 
the ‘Structure Conduct Performance’ (SCP) model [see e.g. Berger et al. (2004), and 
Bos (2004)], which assumes that market structure affects banks’ behaviour, which in turn  
determines their performance.2 The idea is that banks with larger market shares may have 
more market power and use that. Moreover, a smaller number of banks make collusion 
more likely. To test the SCP-hypothesis, performance (profit) is explained by market structure, 
as measured by the HHI. Many articles test this model jointly with an alternative explanation of 
performance, namely the efficiency hypothesis, which attributes differences in performance 
(or profit) to differences in efficiency [e.g. Goldberg and Rai (1996), and Smirlock (1985)]. 
As has been mentioned above, the Boone indicator can be seen as an elaboration on the 
assumptions underlying this efficiency hypothesis (EH). This EH test is based on estimating an 
equation which explains profits from both market structure variables and measures 
of efficiency. The EH assumes that market structure variables do not contribute to profits 
once efficiency is considered as cause of profit. As Bikker and Bos (2005) show, this EH test 
suffers from a multicollinearity problem if the EH holds. 
Market power may also be related to profits, in the sense that extremely high profits 
may be indicative of a lack of competition. A traditional measure of profitability is the 
price-cost margin (PCM), which is the output price minus marginal costs, divided by 
output price. The PCM is frequently used in the empirical industrial organization literature 
as an empirical approximation of the theoretical Lerner index.3 In the literature banks’ 
                                                                          
2. Bikker and Bos (2005), pp. 22 and 23. 
3. The Lerner index derives from the monopolist's profit maximisation condition as price minus marginal cost, divided by 
price. The monopolist maximises profits when the Lerner index is equal to the inverse price elasticity of market demand. 
Under perfect competition, the Lerner index is zero (market demand is infinitely elastic), in monopoly it approaches one 
for positive non-zero marginal cost. The Lerner index can be derived for intermediary cases as well. For a discussion 
see Church and Ware (2000). 
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efficiency is often seen as proxy of competition. The existence of scale and scope economies 
has in the past been investigated thoroughly. It is often assumed that, under strong 
competition, unused scale economies would be exploited and, consequently, reduced.4 
Hence, the existence of non-exhausted scale economies is an indication that the potential 
to reduce costs has not been exhausted and, therefore, can be seen as an indirect 
indicator of (imperfect) competition [Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008)]. The existence 
of scale efficiency is also important as regards the potential entry of new firms, which is a 
major determinant of competition. Strong scale effects would place new firms in an 
unfavourable position. 
A whole strand of literature is focused on X-efficiency, which reflects managerial 
ability to drive down production costs, controlled for output volumes and input price levels. 
X-efficiency of firm i is defined as the difference in cost levels between that firm and the 
best practice firms of similar size and input prices [Leibenstein (1966)]. Heavy competition is 
expected to force banks to drive down their X-inefficiency, so that the latter is often used 
as an indirect measure of competition. An overview of the empirical literature is presented in 
Bikker (2004) and Bikker and Bos (2005). 
2.2 Relationship between competition and monetary transmission 
According to the seminal papers by Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) on banks’ interest rate 
setting behaviour, banks can exert a degree of market pricing power in determining loan 
and deposit rates. The Monti-Klein model demonstrates that interest rates on bank products 
with smaller demand elasticities are priced less competitively. Hence, both the levels of bank 
interest rates and their changes over time are expected to depend on the degree of 
competition. With respect to the level of bank interest rates, Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara (2004) show that an increase in banks’ market power (i.e. a reduction in competitive 
pressure) results in higher net interest margins.5 In addition, Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) 
explain the difference between bank retail interest rates and money market rates by bank’s 
product-specific concentration indices. They find that in concentrated markets, retail lending 
rates are substantially higher, while deposits rates are lower. 
Regarding the effect of competition on the way banks adjust their lending and 
deposit rates, Hannan and Berger (1991) find that deposit rates are significantly more rigid 
in concentrated markets. Especially in periods of rising monetary policy rates, banks in more 
consolidated markets tend not to raise their deposit rates, which may be indicative of 
(tacit) collusive behaviour among banks. In a cross-country analysis, both Cottarelli 
and Kourelis (1994) and Borio and Fritz (1995) find a significant effect of constrained 
competition on the monetary transmission mechanism. Thus, lending rates tend to be stickier 
when banks operate in a less competitive environment, due to, inter alia, the existence of 
barriers to entry. This finding was confirmed in an Italian setting by Cottarelli et al. (1995). 
Reflecting the existence of bank market power and collusive behaviour as well as potential 
switching costs for bank customers (or other factors affecting demand elasticities), the degree 
of price stickiness is likely to be asymmetric over the (monetary policy) interest rate cycle.6 
Against this background, Mojon (2001) tests for the impact of banking competition on the 
                                                                          
4. This interpretation would be different in a market numbering only a few banks. It would also be different in a market 
where many new entries incur unfavourable scale effects during the initial phase of their growth path. 
5. Of course, competition is not the only factor determining the level of bank interest rates. Factors such as credit and 
interest risk, banks’ degree of risk aversion, operating costs, and bank efficiency are also likely to impact on bank 
margins. See, for example, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004). 
6. See, for example, Neuwark and Sharpe (1992) and Mester and Saunders (1985) for empirical evidence of asymmetric 
interest rate pass-through effects among US banks. 
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transmission process related to euro area bank lending rates, using an index of deregulation, 
constructed by Gual (1999). He finds that higher competition tends to put pressure on banks 
to adjust lending rates quicker when money market rates are decreasing. Furthermore, higher 
competition tends to reduce the ability of banks to increase lending rates (although not 
significantly), when money market rates are moving up ⎯ and vice versa for deposit rates.7 
Similar findings of asymmetric pass-through effects have been found by Scholnick (1996), 
Heinemann and Schüler (2002), Sander and Kleimeier (2002 and 2004) and Gropp 
et al. (2007).8 Moreover, De Bondt (2005) argues that stronger competition from other 
banks and from capital markets has helped to speed up the euro area banks’ interest rate 
adjustments to changes in market rates. 
A number of country-specific studies also provide evidence of sluggish pass-through 
from market rates into bank rates when competition is weak. For example, Heffernan (1997) 
finds that British banks’ interest rate adjustment is compatible with imperfect competition 
whereas Weth (2002), by using various proxies for bank market power, provides evidence of 
sluggish and asymmetric pass-through among German banks. De Graeve et al. (2004) 
estimate the determinants of the interest rate pass-through on Belgian banks and find that 
banks with more market power pursue a less competitive pricing policy. In a microeconomic 
analysis of Spanish banks, Lago-González and Salas-Fumás (2005) provide evidence 
that a mixture of price adjustment costs and bank market power causes price rigidity and 
asymmetric pass-through. In a cross-country study, Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) show 
that differences in the pass-through process across the euro area countries may to some 
extent be explained by national differences in bank competition. Finally, in another euro area 
based study, Gropp et al. (2007) provide evidence that the level of banking competition has 
a positive impact on the degree of bank interest rate pass-through. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
7. In addition to bank competition, switching costs and other interest rate adjustment costs, bank rate rigidity may also 
be due to credit risk factors. For example, in a situation of credit rationing banks may decide to leave lending rates 
unchanged and to limit the supply of loans instead; see, for example, Winker (1999). Banks may also choose to provide 
their borrowers with ‘implicit interest rate insurance’ by smoothing bank loan rates over the cycle; see Berger and 
Udell (1992). Finally, sometimes banks give customers an interest rate option for a given period. These banks have to 
recoup the costs of their options which may reduce the speed of the interest rate pass through for outstanding clients. 
8. Sander and Kleimeier (2002 and 2004) differ from others studies in that they also modelling asymmetries the severity 
of the interest rate shock (rather than merely its direction). This approach aims to take into account menu cost 
arguments implying that banks tend to pass on changes in market rates of a minimum size only. 
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3 The Boone indicator as measure of competition 
Boone’s indicator assumes that more efficient firms (that is, firms with lower marginal costs) 
will gain higher market shares or profits, and that this effect will be stronger the heavier 
competition in that market is. In order to support this intuitive market characteristic, 
Boone develops a broad set of theoretical models [see Boone (2000, 2001 and 2004), Boone 
et al. (2004) and CPB (2000)]. We use one of these models to explain the Boone indicator 
and to examine its properties compared to common measures such as the HHI and the 
PCM. Following Boone et al. (2004), and replacing ‘firms’ by ‘banks’, we consider a banking 
industry where each bank i produces one product qi (or portfolio of banking products), which 
faces a demand curve of the form: 
p (qi, qj≠i) = a – b qi – d ∑j≠i qj (1) 
and has constant marginal costs mci. This bank maximizes profits πi = (pi – mci) qi by 
choosing the optimal output level qi. We assume that a > mci and 0 < d ≤ b. The first-order 
condition for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium can then be written as: 
a –2 b qi – d ∑ i≠j qj – mci = 0 (2) 
Where N banks produce positive output levels, we can solve the N first-order 
conditions (2), yielding: 
qi (ci) = [(2 b/d – 1) a – (2 b/d + N – 1) mci + ∑ j mcj]/[(2 b + d (N – 1))(2 b/d – 1)] (3) 
We define profits πi as variable profits excluding entry costs ε. Hence, a bank enters 
the banking industry if, and only if, πi ≥ ε in equilibrium. Note that Equation (3) provides a 
relationship between output and marginal costs. It follows from πi = (pi – mci) qi that profits 
depend on marginal costs in a quadratic way. Competition in this market increases as the 
produced (portfolios of) services of the various banks become closer substitutes, that is, as d 
increases (with d kept below b). Further, competition increases when entry costs ε decline. 
Boone et al. (2004) prove that market shares of more efficient banks (that is, with lower 
marginal costs mc) increase both under regimes of stronger substitution and amid lower 
entry costs. 
Equation (3) supports the use of the following model for market share, defined as 
si = qi / ∑ j qj: 
ln si = α + β ln mci  (4) 
The market shares of banks with lower marginal costs are expected to increase, 
so that β is negative. The stronger competition is, the stronger this effect will be, and the 
larger, in absolute terms, this (negative) value of β. We refer to β as the Boone indicator. 
For empirical reasons, Equation (4) has been specified in log-linear terms in order to deal with 
heteroskedasticty. Moreover, this specification implies that β is an elasticity, which facilitates 
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interpretation, particularly across equations.9 The choice of functional form is not essential, 
as the log-linear form is just an approximation of the pure linear form. 
The theoretical model above can also be used to explain why widely-applied 
measures such as the HHI and the PCM fail as reliable competition indicators. The standard 
intuition of the HHI is based on a Cournot model with homogenous banks, where a fall in 
entry barriers reduces the HHI. However, with banks that differ in efficiency, an increase 
in competition through a rise in d reallocates output to the more efficient banks that already 
had higher output levels. Hence, the increase in competition raises the HHI instead of 
lowering it. The effect of increased competition on the industry’s PCM may also be perverse. 
Generally, heavier competition reduces the PCM of all banks. But since more efficient banks 
may have a higher PCM (skimming off the part of profits that stems from their efficiency lead), 
the increase of their market share may raise the industry’s average PCM, contrary to common 
expectations. 
We note that the Boone indicator model, like every other model, is a simplification 
of reality. First, efficient banks may choose to translate lower costs either into higher profits or 
into lower output prices in order to gain market share. Our approach assumes that the 
behaviour of banks is between these two extreme cases, so that banks generally pass on at 
least part of their efficiency gains to their clients. More precisely, we assume that the banks’ 
passing-on behaviour, which drives Equation (4), does not diverge too strongly across 
the banks. Second, our approach ignores differences in bank product quality and design, 
as well as the attractiveness of innovations. We assume that banks are forced over time to 
provide quality levels that are more or less similar. By the same token, we presume that 
banks have to follow the innovations of their peers. Hence, like many other model-based 
measures, the Boone indicator approach focuses on one important relationship affected by 
competition; thereby disregarding other aspects [see also Bikker and Bos (2005)]. Naturally, 
annual estimates of β are more likely to be impaired by these distortions than the 
estimates covering the full sample period. Also, compared to direct measures of competition, 
the Boone indicator may have the disadvantage of being an estimate and thus surrounded 
by a degree of uncertainty. Of course, other model-based measures, such as Panzar 
and Rosse’s H-statistic, suffer from the same disadvantage. The latter shortcoming affects 
the annual estimates βt more strongly than the full-sample period estimate β. 
As the Boone indicator may be time dependent, reflecting changes in competition 
over time, we estimate β separately for every year (hence, βt). An absolute benchmark for the 
level of β is not available. We only know that more negative betas reflect stronger competition. 
Comparing the indicator across countries or industries helps to interpret estimation results. 
For that reason, Boone and Weigand in CPB (2000) and Boone et al. (2004) apply the model 
to different manufacturing industries. Since measurement errors ⎯including unobserved 
country or industry specific factors⎯ are less likely to vary over time than across industries, 
the time series interpretation of beta is probably more robust than the cross-sector 
one (that is, comparison of β for various countries or industries at a specific moment in time). 
Therefore, Boone focuses mainly on the change in βt over time within a given industry, 
rather than comparing β between industries. 
We improve on Boone’s approach in two ways. First, we calculate marginal costs 
instead of approximating this variable with average costs. We are able to do so by estimating 
                                                                          
9. The few existing empirical studies based on the Boone indicator all use a log linear relationship. See, for example, 
Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008). 
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a translog cost function, which is more precise and more closely in line with theory. 
An important advantage is that these marginal costs allow focussing on segments of the 
market, such as the loan market, where no direct observations of individual cost items 
are available. Second, we use market share as our dependent variable instead of profits. 
The latter is, by definition, the product of market shares and profit margin. We have views 
with respect to the impact of efficiency on market share and its relation with competition, 
supported by the theoretical framework above, whereas we have no a priori knowledge 
about the effect of efficiency on the profit margin. Hence, a market share model will be 
more precise. An even more important advantage of market shares is that they are always 
positive, whereas the range of profits (or losses) includes negative values. A log-linear 
specification would exclude negative profits (losses) by definition, so that the estimation 
results would be distorted by sample bias, because inefficient, loss-making banks would 
be ignored. 
In order to be able to calculate marginal costs, we estimate, for each country, 
a translog cost function (TCF) using individual bank observations. This function assumes that 
the technology of an individual bank can be described by a single one multiproduct 
production function. Under proper conditions, a dual cost function can be derived from 
such a production function, using output levels and factor prices as arguments. A TCF 
is a second-order Taylor expansion around the mean of a generic dual cost function with all 
variables appearing as logarithms. It is a flexible functional form that has proven to be an 
effective tool in explaining multiproduct bank services. Our TCF has different marginal costs 
for different types of banks, resulting in the following form: 
ln cith = α0 + ∑h=1,..,(H-1) αh dih + ∑t=1,..,(T-1) δt dt + ∑h=1,..,H ∑j=1,..,K βjh ln xijt dih 
             +∑h=1,..,H ∑j=1,..,K ∑k=1,..,K γjkh ln xijt ln xikt dih + vit (5) 
where the dependent variable cith reflects the production costs of bank i (i = 1,..., N) in year t 
(t = 1,..., T). The sub-index h (h = 1,..., H) refers to the type category of the bank (commercial, 
savings or cooperative bank). The variable dih is a dummy variable, which is 1 if bank i is of 
type h and otherwise zero. Another dummy variable is dt,, which is 1 in year t and otherwise 
zero. The explanatory variables xikt represent three groups of variables (k = 1,...,< K). The first 
group consists of (K1) bank output components, such as loans, securities and other 
services (proxied by other income). The second group consists of (K2) input prices, such as 
wage rates, deposit rates (as price of funding) and the price of other expenses (proxied as the 
ratio of other expenses to fixed assets). The third group consists of (K-K1-K2) control variables 
(also called ‘netputs’), e.g. the equity ratio. In line with Berger and Mester (1997), the equity 
ratio corrects for differences in loan portfolio risk across banks. The coefficients αh, βjh and γjkh, 
all vary with h, the bank type. The parameters δt are the coefficients of the time dummies and 
vit is the error term. 
Two standard properties of cost functions are linear homogeneity in the input 
prices and cost-exhaustion [see e.g. Beattie and Taylor (1985), and Jorgenson (1986)]. They 
impose the following restrictions on the parameters, assuming ⎯without loss of generality⎯ 
that the indices j and k of the two sum terms in Equation (5) are equal to 1, 2 or 3, 
respectively, for wages, funding rates and prices of other expenses: 
β1 + β2 + β3 = 1, γ1,k + γ2,k + γ3,k = 0 for k = 1, 2, 3, and γk,1 + γk,2 + γk,3 = 0 for k = 4,.., K (6) 
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The first restriction stems from cost exhaustion, reflecting the fact that the 
sum of cost shares is equal to unity. In other words, the value of the three inputs is 
equal to total costs. Linear homogeneity in the input prices requires that the three linear 
input price elasticities (βi) add up to 1, whereas the squared and cross terms of all 
explanatory variables (γi,j) add up to zero. Again without loss of generality, we also 
apply symmetry restrictions γj,k = γk,j for j, k = 1, .., K.10 As Equation (5) expresses that 
we assume different cost functions for each type of banks, the restrictions (6) likewise apply 
to each type of bank. 
The marginal costs of output category j = l (of loans) for bank i of category h in year t, 
mcilth are defined as: 
mci1th = ∂ cith / ∂ xi1t = (cith./ xi1t) ∂ ln cith / ∂ ln xilt (7) 
The term ∂ ln cith / ∂ ln xilt is the first derivative of Equation (5) of costs to loans. We use 
the marginal costs of the output component ‘loans’ only (and not for the other K1 
components) as we investigate the loan markets. We estimate a separate translog cost 
function for each individual sector in each individual country, allowing for differences in the 
production structure across bank types within a country. This leads to the following equation 
of the marginal costs for output category loans (l) for bank i in category h during year t: 
mci1th = cith / xi1t (β1h + 2 γ1lh ln xilt + ∑k=1,..,K; k ≠ l γ1kh ln xikt ) dih  (8) 
 
                                                                          
10. The restrictions are imposed on Equation (5), so that the equation is reformulated in terms of a lower number of 
parameters. 
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4 The interest rate pass-through model 
Our analysis of the pass-through of market rates to bank interest rates takes into account 
that economic variables may be non-stationary.11 The relationship between non-stationary 
but cointegrated variables should preferably be based on an error-correction model (ECM), 
which allows disentangling the long-run co-movement of the variables from the short-run 
adjustment towards the equilibrium. Accordingly, most of the pass-through studies 
conducted in recent years apply an ECM, as it allows testing for both the long-run equilibrium 
pass-through of bank rates to changes in market rates and the speed of adjustment 
towards the equilibrium.12 Using a panel-econometric approach, we test for the impact of 
banking competition (measured by the Boone indicator) on the long-run bank interest rate 
pass-through. 
4.1 Estimation of the long-run relationship 
If bank interest rates and their corresponding market rates are cointegrated, we may analyse 
their long-run relationship in an error-correction framework. Hereby, we test for the three 
hypotheses by estimating the following two equations for each of the six considered 
interest rates:13 
t,iiit,it,it,iit,it,i uDMRBIMRBIBR ++++= δγβα  (9.a) 
t,it,it,it,iit,iit,i vMRBIMRuBR +++= − ∆ϕ∆ηθ∆ 1  (9.b) 
Equation (9.a) reflects the long-run equilibrium pass-through, while Equation (9.b) 
presents the short-term adjustments of bank interest rates to their long-run equilibrium. 
BRi,t and MRi,t are the bank interest rate and the corresponding market rate, respectively, in 
country i (for I = 1,…, N) at time t (for t = 1,…, T), observed at a quarterly basis. BIi,t is the 
Boone indicator of country i at time t. For convenience’s sake, the Boone indicator is 
redefined in positive terms, so that an increase in the Boone indicator reflects stronger 
competition (hence BI = – β). In all estimations, we include the market interest rates for the 
different countries separately (βi MRi,t and ηi ΔMRi,t, respectively, in the long and short run), 
in order to observe country-specific effects, as well as multiplied by the Boone indicator 
(γ BIi,t MRi,t and φ BIi, t ΔMRi,t, respectively, in the long and short run), in order to capture the 
(overall) impact of competition on the pass-through. Furthermore, in the long-run model 
we account for country effects, by using country dummies (Di). The short-run model includes 
the error-correction term (θi ui,t-1), the effects of competition on short-term adjustments in 
market rates (φ BIi,t ∆MRi,t) for all countries simultaneously and the change in the market 
interest rate for each country separately (ηi ∆MRi,t). 
In Equations (9.a) and (9.b), we estimate European-wide (or panel) parameters for 
the various competition effects (α, γ and φ), because the Boone indicator varies insufficiently 
over time to estimate reliable country-specific effects. The other parameters (βi, ηi and θi) 
                                                                          
11. In order to avoid spurious results, see Granger and Newbold (1974). 
12. See, for example, Mojon (2001), De Bondt (2002 and 2005), Sander and Kleimeier (2004), and Kok Sørensen and 
Werner (2006). 
13. Namely, four types of loan products (mortgage loans, consumer loans and short and long-term loans to enterprises) 
and two types of deposits (time deposits and current account deposits). 
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remain country-specific, unless restrictions that these parameters are equal across all 
countries considered would be accepted by a Wald test. 
The three hypotheses to be tested are: 
I) Are loan interest rates lower, and are deposit interest rates higher, in more competitive 
loan markets than in less competitive loan markets? 
H0: α + γ  MRi,t < 0 and H1: α + γ  MRi,t ≥ 0;14 
(and H0: α + γ  MRi,t > 0 and H1: α + γ  MRi,t ≤ 0, respectively, for deposit rates). 
 
II) Are long-run loan and deposit interest rates responses to the corresponding market rates 
stronger in more competitive loan markets than in less competitive loan markets? H0: γ > 0 
and H1: γ  ≤  0. 
 
III) Do more competitive markets adjust faster, in the short run, to changes in market interest 
rates than in less competitive markets? 
H0: φ > 0 and H1: φ ≤  0. 
As we measure competition on the loan market, the competition effects on the 
deposit-rate pass-through may be less reliable. Loan market competition might have a 
positive impact on deposit markets also, implying α1 + γ1 MRi,t > 0. Alternatively, banks may try 
to compensate for strong loan market competition by exploiting their market power in the 
deposit market, in which case α1 + γ1 MRi,t <0. 
4.2 Unit root and panel cointegration tests 
UNIT ROOT TESTS 
As a first preparatory step, we investigate the unit root properties of the variables.15 
We apply two types of tests based on two different null hypotheses. The Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (2003) test (henceforth the IPS test) is a panel version of the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test on unit roots. It is based on the following regression equation: 
tijti
p
j
jitiiiti yyy
j
,,
1
,1,, εβρα +∆∑++=∆ −=−   (10) 
The interest rate series under investigation is yi,t and it must be observable for each 
country i and each month t. The autoregressive parameter ρi is estimated for each country 
separately, which allows for a large degree of heterogeneity. The null hypothesis is, H0: ρi = 0 
for all i, against the alternative hypothesis H1: ρi > 0 for some countries. The test statistic Zt_bar 
of the IPS test is constructed by cross-section-averaging the individual t-statistics for ρi. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity. 
As a cross-check, we add results based on Hadri’s (2000) test, which is a panel 
version of the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) test, testing the null hypothesis 
of stationarity. The model underlying the Hadri test can be written as: 
                                                                          
14. Note that competition causes a downwards shift to the level of bank interest rates (that is, α1 < 0) as well as a 
change in the relationship between market rates and bank rates (expressed by γ1 MRi,t). 
15. For a survey of panel unit root tests, see Banerjee (1999). For a more detailed description and application to a similar 
set of data, see also Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006). 
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ti
t
iiti uy ,
1
,, εα τ τ +∑+= =   (11) 
The time series yi,t are broken down into two components, a random walk 
component ∑τ ui,τ and a stationary component εi,t. The test statistic Zτ is based on the ratio of 
the variances σ2u / σ2ε. The null hypothesis of the test assumes that this ratio is zero, which 
implies that there is no random walk component. Rejection of this test’s null hypothesis 
indicates the presence of unit root behaviour of the variable under investigation. Both panel 
series test statistics are asymptotically normal. 
COINTEGRATION TESTS 
In a second preliminary step, we test for cointegration using panel cointegration tests by 
Pedroni (1999 and 2004) which are based on the following regression models: 
ti
K
j tijijiti xy ,1 ,,,, εβα +∑+= =  (12) 
The long-run coefficients βi,j may be different across the euro area countries. We use 
the group mean panel version of the Pedroni test. The null hypothesis of this test assumes a 
unit root in the residuals of the cointegration regression, which implies absence of 
cointegration. The alternative hypothesis assumes a root less than one, but allows for different 
roots in different countries.16 We use three different types of test statistics: an ADF type which 
is similar to the ADF statistic used in univariate unit-root tests, a nonparametric Phillips-Perron 
(PP) version, and a version which is based directly on the autoregressive coefficient (ρ-test). 
 
                                                                          
16. In the panel versions of the tests the alternative hypothesis assumes a root which is less than one but is identical 
between the countries. Hence, the group mean versions allow for stronger heterogeneity. As a result, we focus on the 
test’s group mean version. 
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5 The data 
5.1 The Boone indicator 
This paper uses the Bankscope database of banks from eight euro area countries during 
1992-2004, namely Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. Our choice of countries was limited by the availability of (usable) data. For countries 
such as Finland, Greece and Ireland not enough data are available. Luxembourg is excluded 
from our sample because its figures presumably do not reflect local market conditions due 
to the high international profile of its banks. We focus on commercial banks, savings 
banks, cooperative banks and mortgage banks, ignoring the 25% more specialized 
institutions such as investment banks, securities firms, long-term credit banks and 
specialized governmental credit institutions. An exception is made for Germany in order to 
achieve a more adequate coverage of the national banking systems: specialized German 
governmental credit institutions, comprising mainly the major Landesbanken, are included. 
In addition to certain public finance duties, the Landesbanken also offer banking activities in 
competition with private sector banks, and thus should be included to ensure adequate cover 
of the competitive environment in the German banking system [see Hackethal (2004)]. 
The appendix provides a detailed description of the data; see also Van Leuvensteijn 
et al. (2007). Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of the estimated Boone indicator.17 
Over the 1994-2004 period we observe that, on average, banking competition is heaviest 
in Spain, Germany and Italy. Competition appears to be less strong in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Austria, and is found to be weakest in France and Portugal. At the same 
time, Boone indicators for many countries vary considerably over time.18 
 
Table 5.1 Summary statistics of the Boone indicator (1994-2004) 
 AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT 
Average -1.5 -2.6 -4.0 -4.8 -0.6 -4.0 -2.5 -0.9
Standard deviation 2.3 0.7 1.5 1.8 0.5 1.8 1.5 1.2
Maximum 4.3 -1.5 -2.5 -2.7 0.3 -1.6 1.0 1.6
Minimum -4.0 -3.4 -7.1 -9.6 -1.3 -7.3 -4.4 -2.4
 
5.2 Bank interest rates and market rates 
Our bank loan interest rates are from the ECB’s MFI Interest Rate (MIR) statistics, which since 
January 2003 have been compiled on a harmonised basis across all euro area countries. 
Prior to January 2003 the series have been extended backwards to January 1994 using the 
non-harmonised national retail interest rate (NRIR) statistics compiled by the national central 
                                                                          
17. The Boone indicator results in this paper may seem different from those in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). However, 
both working papers use identical estimates of the Boone indicator. The estimates in the appendix of the present paper 
are exactly equal to the estimates in Table 5.4 in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). However, the presentation of the results 
differs in two respects from Table 5.3 in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). First, in this paper we present three additional 
euro-area countries, namely Austria, Belgium and Portugal. Second, in Table 5.3 of Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) 
we compare the average Boone indicator across the European countries by estimating a single parameter for each 
country over the entire sample period. In this way, we obtain a weighted average of the Boone indicator over the entire 
period instead of an unweighted average of the annually (time dependent) estimates as in Table 5.1. See the appendix 
for the yearly estimates of the Boone indicator. 
18. For more details, see Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). 
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banks of the (later) Eurosystem.19 The MIR statistics consist of more detailed breakdowns 
than the NRIR statistics, particularly with respect to the size of loans and the rate fixation 
periods. In order to link the two sets of statistics, the MIR series have been aggregated 
(using new business volumes as weights) to the broader product categories of the NRIR 
statistics, which include rates on mortgage loans, rates on consumer loans, rates on 
short-term loans to non-financial corporations (≤1 year), rates on long-term loans to 
non-financial corporations (>1 year), rates on current account deposits and rates on time 
deposits. The data period covers 147 monthly observations ranging from January 1994 
to March 2006. 
We select market rates which correspond to these bank interest rates in terms of the 
rate fixation period. Hence, a three-month money market rate is selected to correspond 
with bank rates that are either floating or fixed for short periods (below one year), while 
longer-term government bond yields are selected for long-term fixed bank rates.20 Table 5.2 
presents the data availability of bank interest rates in each country and for each product 
category together with the corresponding market rates. Note that there is strong variation in 
interest rate fixation periods across both products and countries. For instance, in many of the 
considered euro area countries the predominant fixation period for mortgages is rather short, 
proxied by three months. For Germany and France, however, the typical fixation period on 
consumer loans is quite long, approximated here by five years. 
 
Table 5.2 Availability of bank interest rates and corresponding market rates 
 Mortgage 
loans 
Consumer 
loans 
Short-term 
enterprise 
loans 
Long-term 
enterprise 
loans 
Current 
account 
deposits 
Time 
deposits 
AT April 1995 
3M MR 
April 1995 
3M MR 
April 1995 
3M MR 
 April 1995 
3M MR 
April 1995 
3M MR 
B0E Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
5Y MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
5Y MR 
 Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
DE Jan. 1994 
10Y MR 
Jan. 1994 
5Y MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Nov. 1996 
5Y MR 
 Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
ES Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
FR Jan. 1994 
10Y MR 
Jan. 1994 
5Y MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
5Y MR 
 Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
IT Jan. 1995 
3M MR 
 Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1995 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Feb. 1995 
3M MR 
NL Jan. 1994 
10Y MR 
 Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
 Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
PT Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
  Jan. 1994 
3M MR 
Sources: ECB and Bloomberg. 
 
Note: Date indicates: ‘available since’; ‘3M MR’ is the 3-month money market rate (MR). ‘5Y MR’ is 
the 5-year government bond yield. ‘10Y MR’ is the 10-year government bond yield, all for the respective 
country. 
 
 
                                                                          
19. For some bank products in some countries, it is not possible (due to insufficient data being available) to extend 
interest rates series all the way back to 1994. Hence, we use unbalanced samples for some bank products. 
20. The market rates have been chosen to best match bank interest rates on the basis of information from the 
Methodological Notes for the NRIR statistics and from the volume weights of the MIR statistics. 
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Table 5.3 Summary statistics of the various bank interest rates (1994-2004; in %) 
  AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT 
 Mortgage rates  
Average 5.6 5.9 6.4 6.6 6.1 7.0 5.7 7.6 
Standard deviation 1.0 1.2 1.1 2.7 1.5 3.2 1.0 3.5 
Maximum 7.9 8.8 9.1 11.5 8.9 13.0 8.0 14.5 
Minimum 3.8 3.8 4.5 3.1 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.4 
  Consumer lending rates    
Average 6.6 8.1 7.5 10.4 8.8 13.1 
Standard deviation 1.1 0.5 1.0 2.8 1.7 3.6 
Maximum 9.5 9.1 10.2 16.2 12.1 19.6 
Minimum 5.0 7.3 6.3 7.1 6.2 8.6 
  Rates on short-term loans to enterprises   
Average 4.8 4.6 4.0 5.9 4.5 6.7 4.2 8.8 
Standard deviation 1.0 1.1 0.7 2.2 1.5 2.8 1.0 3.8 
Maximum 7.2 7.6 5.8 10.5 7.8 11.7 6.5 16.8 
Minimum 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 2.6 3.3 2.8 4.4 
  Rates on long-term loans to enterprises  
Average 5.1 5.2 5.7 5.9 6.3 
Standard deviation 1.1 0.5 2.4 1.4 2.7 
Maximum 8.2 6.1 10.4 8.8 11.8 
Minimum 3.4 4.2 3.0 4.0 3.1 
 Current account deposit rates  
Average 1.3  1.8 2.6 1.7 
Standard deviation 0.2 1.2 1.8 0.3 
Maximum 1.7 4.6 5.7 2.0 
Minimum 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.1 
 Time deposit rates  
Average 3.5 3.4 4.4 3.8 4.0 3.3 4.1 3.4 
Standard deviation 1.0 0.9 2.1 1.3 2.3 0.9 2.2 0.8 
Maximum 6.3 5.4 8.9 8.0 9.1 5.4 8.7 5.1 
Minimum 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.0 
 
Table 5.3 shows summary statistics of the bank interest rate data. Bank interest 
rates differ substantially across countries, across products and over time. On average, over 
the 1994-2004 period, mortgage rates and consumer lending rates were highest (lowest) 
in Portugal (Austria). Regarding short-term loans to enterprises rates were on average highest 
(lowest) in Portugal (Germany), whereas regarding long-term loans to enterprises rates were 
highest (lowest) in Italy (Belgium). On the deposit side, current account deposit rates 
were lowest (highest) in Austria (Italy), while time deposit rates were lowest (highest) in Italy 
(Germany). Regarding developments over time, it may be noted that the variation of bank 
interest rates was highest in the Mediterranean countries reflecting the particular strong 
decline in the overall level of interest rates in those countries. 
Table 5.4 details the market interest rates for the considered countries. We find that 
Italy has, on average, the highest three-month money market rate and the Netherlands 
the lowest. The same picture arises for the 5-year government bond yield. The minima 
for the three-month money market rates and the two government bond yields with, 
respectively, a 5 and 10 year fixation period are very similar across all countries: these minima 
where reached after the introduction of the euro in 1999. 
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Table 5.4 Summary statistics of the various market rates (1994-2004; in %) 
  AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT 
 3-month money market rate 
Average 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.9 3.9 5.4 3.5 5.3 
Standard deviation 0.9 1.1 1.0 2.3 1.4 2.8 1.0 2.9 
Maximum 5.5 7.0 5.9 9.7 8.1 11.0 5.4 12.7 
Minimum 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
 5-year government bond yield 
Average 4.7 4.8 4.5 5.7 4.8 6.1 4.6 5.9 
Standard deviation 1.1 1.2 1.0 2.6 1.3 2.9 1.1 2.7 
Maximum 7.3 8.0 7.1 12.2 7.9 13.4 7.3 12.2 
Minimum 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.7 
 10-year government bond yield 
Average 5.2 5.4  5.3  
Standard deviation 1.0 1.2  1.0  
Maximum   7.6  8.2  7.7  
Minimum 3.6 3.6  3.6  
 
Table 5.5 presents the spreads between the various bank and market rates. 
We present the spreads on deposits as a negative number as the market interest rates are 
higher than the bank lending rates on these products. On average, the spreads are narrow 
ranging from 0.5% to 2.0%, with the notable exception of consumer loans where bank 
interest rates often include very high risk premiums. 
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Table 5.5 Summary statistics of the various bank-rate spreads (1994-2004; in %) 
 AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT 
 Mortgage rates   
Average 2.1 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.9 1.1 2.2 
Standard deviation 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.2 1.0 
Maximum 3.6 3.5 2.4 2.9 3.8 3.7 1.7 4.5 
Minimum 0.8 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 Consumer lending rates 
Average 3.2 4.2 3.1 5.5 4.0 7.7 
Standard deviation 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.3 
Maximum 5.1 6.5 5.2 7.2 7.0 10.2 
Minimum 2.1 2.6 1.4 4.2 2.3 4.4 
 Rates on short-term loans to enterprises 
Average 1.3 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.6 1.3 0.7 3.4 
Standard deviation 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.3 1.1 
Maximum 2.9 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.8 2.5 1.3 6.7 
Minimum 0.4 0.4 -0.4 0.5 -1.8 -0.4 -0.1 1.9 
 Rates on long-term loans to enterprises 
Average  0.4 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.3 
Standard deviation 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.4 
Maximum 1.2 1.8 1.8 2.2 3.3 
Minimum  -0.3 0.5 0.1 -0.4 -0.5 
 Current account deposit rates  
Average -2.0  -2.9  -2.7 -1.7 
Standard deviation 0.7 1.2  1.1 0.8 
Maximum -1.0 -1.4  -1.3 -0.8 
Minimum -3.8 -5.9  -6.0 -3.5 
 Time deposit rates   
Average -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.9 -0.2 -1.1 
Standard deviation 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.9 
Maximum 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.6 -0.1 
Minimum -1.5 -0.7 -0.6 -1.1 -0.3 -2.6 -1.1 -4.7 
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6 Empirical results 
Estimates of the Boone indicator for the loan markets in the euro area countries are presented 
in the appendix. This approach is similar to the procedure applied in Van Leuvensteijn 
et al. (2007). We obtain annual estimates of the Boone indicator. As the regressions in this 
section are based on monthly data, we calculate ‘smoothed’ Boone indicator values using 
moving averages over six months. 
6.1 Unit root and cointegration 
Table 6.1 reports the panel unit root tests for the bank and market interest rate series 
of the considered eight euro area countries simultaneously. The outcomes indicate 
non-stationarity at the 5% significance level for all the bank and market interest rate series 
used. The IPS test on the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significance level for either the bank rates or the market rates, suggesting non-stationary 
interest rates. While the IPS test indicates stationarity of the Boone indicator, the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level for the product 
of the Boone indicator and the market rates for three of the six categories, namely mortgage 
loans, consumer loans and time deposits. However, the Hadri-test on the null hypothesis 
of stationarity is clearly rejected in all cases. Furthermore, we apply the panel unit root 
tests for the first differences in interest rates to test on second order non-stationarity. 
The results reject I(2) and, hence, support the conclusion that the interest rate series 
are integrated of order 1, so that I(1) holds. Given these findings, we proceed to test on 
cointegration between bank interest rates and the corresponding market rates. 
 
Table 6.1 Panel unit root tests on model variables applied to all countries 
 Im, Pesaran and Shin test Hadri test 
 Zt_bara p-value Zτ p-value 
 Boone-indicator   
Boone-indicator -2.16 0.02 10.67 0.00 
 Bank interest rates    
Mortgage loans 0.98 0.84 18.78 0.00 
Consumer loans -0.89 0.19 16.59 0.00 
Short-term loans to enterprises -0.68 0.25 18.83 0.00 
Long-term loans to enterprises 0.40 0.66 13.10 0.00 
Current account deposits 1.64 0.95 13.86 0.00 
Time deposits -0.72 0.24 16.03 0.00 
 Market interest rates b    
Mortgage loans 0.04 0.52 17.08 0.00 
Consumer loans 0.34 0.64 15.21 0.00 
Short-term loans to enterprises -0.68 0.25 17.23 0.00 
Long-term loans to enterprises 0.94 0.83 13.39 0.00 
Current account deposits 0.38 0.65 12.60 0.00 
Time deposits -1.56 0.06 16.46 0.00 
 Boone indicator times market interest rates a 
Mortgage loans -2.16 0.01 15.76 0.00 
Consumer loans -1.88 0.03 12.64 0.00 
Short-term loans to enterprises -1.44 0.08 17.46 0.00 
Long-term loans to enterprises -1.38 0.08 13.74 0.00 
Current account deposits -1.60 0.06 12.65 0.00 
Time deposits -2.46 0.01 15.70 0.00 
a The test statistics are explained in Section 4.2; b Market rates are approximated according to Table 5.2. 
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Table 6.2 shows the results for Pedroni’s three panel cointegration tests as applied 
to the long-run models of the six bank rates.21 For bank interest rates on consumer loans 
and current account deposits, the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. 
Apparently, therefore, the adjustment of interest rates on consumer loans and current 
account deposits to changes in market rates is so sluggish that even a long-run relationship 
cannot be detected in our sample.22 Consequently, the results of the error-correction model 
on consumer loans and current account deposits, presented in Section 6.2 below, have to be 
interpreted with caution. For the other four long-run bank rate models, the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration has been rejected (for two of the three tests), indicating a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between bank rates, market rates and the Boone indicator. 
 
Table 6.2 Pedroni cointegration tests on the six long-run bank interest rates models 
Bank interest rates Group mean panel cointegration testsa 
 ρ-statistic PP-statistic ADF-statistic 
Mortgage loans -3.19 (0.00) -3.56 (0.00) -0.07 (0.53) 
Consumer loans 0.73 (0.77) 0.19 (0.57) 0.05 (0.52) 
Short-term loans to enterprises -5.79 (0.00) -4.75 (0.00) -1.50 (0.07) 
Long-term loans to enterprises -2.68 (0.00) -2.91 (0.00) -0.75 (0.22) 
Current account deposits 1.14 (0.87) 1.29 (0.90) 0.66 (0.75) 
Time deposits -8.28 (0.00) -7.08 (0.00) -0.43 (0.33) 
a P-values in parentheses. 
 
6.2 Competition and the bank interest-rate pass-through 
As a first investigation into the impact of competition on the bank interest rate pass-through, 
we analyse the effect of competition on the various spreads between bank and market 
interest rates (see Table 6.3). The main finding is that competition tends to keep bank loan 
rates more closely in line with the corresponding market rates (implying that they are lower). 
Moreover, the results in Table 6.3 show that competition significantly diminishes the 
bank rate spreads for three out of four loan products, namely for mortgages, consumer loans 
and short-term loans to enterprises. No significant effect is found for long-term loans to 
enterprises. The Boone indicator’s elasticities of the first three loan products indicate 
that mortgage loans are least affected by competition while short-term loans to enterprises 
are influenced most strongly. 
For the two deposit categories, competition in the loan market seems to increase 
the (negative) spread between bank and market rates. Hence, deposit rates become lower 
where there is fierce competition in the loan market. This could reflect that the competitive 
pressure is heavier in the loan market than in the deposit markets, so that banks under 
competitive pressure compensate for their decline in loan market income by lowering 
their deposit rates. 
 
 
 
                                                                          
21. P-values of the various test statistics have been derived using the standard normal distribution, which is a valid 
assumption for cointegration tests; see Pedroni (1999). 
22. Data on interest rates on consumer loans and current account deposits prior to January 2003 are only available for 
six and four countries, respectively, which somewhat limits the analysis of these rates. 
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Table 6.3 Effect of competition on the spreads between bank and market rates  
 Mortgage loans Consumer loans Short-term loans to 
enterprises 
  parameter z-value1) parameter z-value parameter z-value 
Boone indicator  -0.030 **-2.12 -0.075 ***-3.03 -0.128 ***-6.72 
Constant 1.357 ***5.54 5.818 ***16.91 0.736 ***3.02 
Country dummies 2) X2(7)=498  X2(5)=3095  X2(7)=911  
Monthly dummies2) X2(119)=693  X2(119)=766  X2(119)=223 
R-squared, centred 0.687  0.907  0.793 
Number of observations 957  717  957 
  
Long-term loans to 
enterprises 
Current account (sight) 
deposits 
Time deposits 
  parameter z-value parameter z-value parameter z-value 
Boone indicator  0.003 0.15 -0.154 ***-8.26 -0.036 ***-3.06 
Constant 1.114 ***4.26 -3.496 ***-12.30 -0.655 ***-2.80 
Country dummies  X2(4)=240  X2(3)=141  X2(7)=640 
Monthly dummies X2(119)=1084  X2(119)=1499  X2(119)=389 
R-squared, centred 0.670 0.832  0.691 
Number of observations 578 477  956 
Two and three asterisks indicate a level of confidence of 95% and 99%, respectively. 1) The z-value 
indicates whether the parameter significantly differs from 0 under the normal distribution with mean zero 
and standard deviation one. 2)  Chi-squared distributed Wald tests on H0 ‘all country dummy coefficients 
are zero’ and ‘all monthly time dummy coefficients are zero’, respectively. The null hypotheses are 
rejected for all loan and deposit types. 
 
Table 6.4 presents the estimated long-run relationship of the error-correction 
model (ECM) described in Section 4.1 [Equation (9.a)], in order to test the three 
hypotheses mentioned in that section. This model explains bank interest rates from 
the Boone indicator and the market interest rates. We use Newey-West’s kernel-based 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance estimations to correct 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, where the bandwidth has been set on two periods. 
We observe that the impact of market rates on bank interest rates is highly significant for 
all six interest rates considered and in all eight euro area countries. Moreover, in line with 
the existing literature, we find that the country-specific long-run pass-through coefficients (βi) 
differ considerably across product categories (and across countries) for both the long and 
short term. The adjustment of bank interest rates to changes in market rates is highest 
for mortgage loans, loans to enterprises and time deposits.23 
The first hypothesis is: are loan interest rates lower, and are deposit interest rates 
higher, in more competitive loan markets than in less competitive loan markets? Contrary 
to the estimations of the spreads presented above, the ECM long-run equation does not 
assume full pass-through of market rates within one month. Table 6.4 shows that the 
effect of the interaction terms with the Boone indicator of competition and the market 
rate is (slightly) positive for all four considered loan products.24 But the Chi-squared 
distributed Wald tests on H0: α + γ MRi,t = 0 also shows that the combined effects of α + γ MRi,t 
on bank rates are not significant. This outcome does not confirm our earlier finding of 
significantly lower loan market spreads under competition. Apparently, the simple spread 
                                                                          
23. See also Mojon (2001), De Bondt (2005) and Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006). 
24. When tested, one single EU-wide parameter for market interest rates was rejected in favour of separate 
country-specific parameters for market interest rates. 
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model is a more successful tool to observe the competition effect than the more 
complicated ECM.25 
The second hypothesis is: do bank interest rates in more competitive markets show 
stronger long-run responses to the corresponding market rates compared to less competitive 
markets? Our results suggest that all four bank loan rates do indeed respond significantly 
more strongly to market rates when competition is high, as reflected by the significant positive 
coefficient γ of the product terms of indicator and market rates for all loan categories. We find 
that competition in the loan market contributes also to a more complete pass-through 
of interest rates on current accounts.26 All in all, we observe that, generally, competition does 
make for stronger long-run bank rate responses to corresponding market rates. 
The third hypothesis is: do more competitive markets adjust faster in the short run to 
changes in market interest rates than in less competitive markets? To test this hypothesis, 
we estimate Equation (9.b). The results in Table 6.5 indicate that the immediate responses 
of banks’ interest rates on loans to changes in market rates tend indeed to be higher in more 
competitive markets (see the coefficient φ of the product terms).27 However, the effect is not 
statistically significant. All in all, we find only limited evidence to support the third hypothesis. 
 
 
 
                                                                          
25. We have tested on a single EU-wide parameter for market interest rates in the long-run ECM model. This null 
hypothesis was rejected for all loan and deposit categories in favour of separate country-specific parameters for market 
interest rates. 
26. As mentioned in Section 4, the estimated long-run relationship between interest rates on consumer loans and 
current account deposits and corresponding market rates may be spurious owing to the lack of a statistically significant 
cointegration relationship. 
27. We have tested on one single EU-wide parameter for market interest rates and for one single EU-wide parameter for 
residuals in the short-run ECM model. The null hypotheses of a single EU-wide parameter were rejected for most loan 
and deposit categories in favour of separate country-specific parameters. 
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Table 6.4 Estimates of the long-run ECM models for the six bank interest rates  
 Mortgage loans Consumer loans Short-term loans to 
enterprises 
 parameter z-value parameter z-value parameter z-value 
Boone indicator (α) -0.198 ***-3.32 -0. 196 **-2.39 -0.153 **-3.39 
Market interest rate AT 0.843 ***8.02 0.824 ***6.15 0.937 ***8.76 
Market interest rate BE 0.913 ***12.26 1.000 ***5.98 0.892 ***23.05 
Market interest rate DE 0.923 ***14.88 0.312 **2.41 0.325 ***6.22 
Market interest rate ES 0.777 ***10.89 0.785 ***7.63 0.725 ***10.90 
Market interest rate FR 0.989 ***12.85 1.093 ***13.38 0.877 ***13.04 
Market interest rate IT 0.870 ***16.07   0.807 ***16.90 
Market interest rate NL 0.784 ***18.11   0.879 ***20.11  
Market interest rate PT 1.274 ***24.63 1.336 ***23.06 1.344 ***37.41 
Market int. r.*Boone ind. (γ) 0.053 ***4.29 0.057 ***3.21 0.039 ***3.47 
Constant 1.951 ***9.74 5.679 ***11.21 2.813 ***13.62 
R-squared, centred 0.940  0.927  0.952  
Number of observations 957  717  957  
α +  γ MRi,t  0.034  0.055  0.002  
x2  H0: α +  γ MRi,t = 0 1) 2.92, p-value = 0.09 2.39, p-value =0.12 0.01, p-value = 0.92 
 
Long-term loans to 
enterprises 
Current account (sight) 
deposits 
Time deposits 
 parameter z-value parameter z-value parameter z-value 
Boone indicator (α) -0.181 ***-3.59 -0.146 ***-5.75 -0.001 -0.60 
Market interest rate AT   0.063 ***2.28 0.616 ***10.17 
Market interest rate BE 0.808 ***16.79   0.921 ***39.45 
Market interest rate DE 0.615 ***11.48   0.894 **33.03 
Market interest rate ES 0.691 ***10.89 0.259 ***6.75 0.925 ***26.99 
Market interest rate FR 0.982 ***14.42   0.997 ***137.37 
Market interest rate IT 0.745 ***18.84 0.433 ***18.09 0.856 ***26.99 
Market interest rate NL   0.083 ***2.19 0.831 ***12.41 
Market interest rate PT     0.798 ***38.33 
Market int. r.e*Boone-ind. (γ) 0.046 ***4.48 0.037 ***5.86 -0.015 -0.60 
Constant 2.591 ***11.58 1.457 ***10.43 0.302 **3.15 
R-squared, centred 0.956  0.966  0.972  
Number of observations 578  477  956  
α +  γ MRi,t 0.028  0.005  -0.024  
x2  H0: α + γ MRi,t = 0 1) 2.26, p-value=0.13 0.53, p-value=0.47 4.29, p-value =0.04 
Note: One, two and three asterisks indicate levels of confidence of 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. 
Country dummies are included but not shown. 
1)  Chi-squared distributed Wald tests on H0 ‘α + γ MRi,t = 0’. The null hypothesis is not rejected for any of 
the loan and for current account deposits. 
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Table 6.5 The short-term ECM model of bank interest rates  
 Mortgage loans Consumer loans Short-term loans to 
enterprises 
  parameter z-value parameter z-value parameter z-value 
∆Market interest rate AT 0.2272 ***3.15 0.203 *1.84 0.275 ***3.41 
∆Market interest rate BE 0.207 *1.73 0.358 1.32 0.408 ***2.49 
∆Market interest rate DE 0.511 ***4.33 -0.267 -1.30 0.159 1.20 
∆Market interest rate ES 0.217 *1.75 0.041 0.10 0.573 ***3.36 
∆Market interest rate FR -0.025 -0.58 -0.005 -0.09 0.079 0.73 
∆Market interest rate IT 0.156 1.11   0.066 0.42 
∆Market interest rate NL 0.262 ***2.79   0.464 ***3.01 
∆Market interest rate PT 0.173 *1.88 0.001 0.00 0.159 0.87 
∆Market interest rate*Boone-ind. (φ) 0.020 0.86 0.071 1.52 0.050 *1.66 
Residual AT (-1) a -0.005 ***-3.10 -0.004 ***-2.89 -0.005 ***-3.00 
Residual BE (-1) -0.007 **-2.20 -0.003 -1.09 -0.005 -1.52 
Residual DE (-1) -0.003 -1.56 -0.003 **-2.07 -0.001 -0.23 
Residual ES (-1) -0.006 ***-2.80 -0.003 -0.86 -0.000 -0.03 
Residual FR (-1) -0.006 ***-3.45 -0.004 ***-3.25 -0.003 -0.44 
Residual IT (-1) -0.006 **-1.96   -0.004 *-1.64 
Residual NL (-1) -0.004 -1.63   -0.000 -0.10 
Residual PT (-1) -0.009 ***-3.89 -0.006 -1.50 -0.011 **-2.28 
R-sq centred  0.19  0.03  0.19  
Number of observations 949  711  949  
  
Long-term loans to 
enterprises 
Current account 
(sight) deposits 
Time deposits 
  parameter z-value parameter z-value parameter z-value 
∆Market interest rate AT  0.107 ***3.05 0.229 ***2.90 
∆Market interest rate BE 0.987 ***6.97   0.532 ****6.02 
∆Market interest rate DE 0.657 ***3.56   0.587 ****6.27 
∆Market interest rate ES 0.994 ***3.67 0.374 ***3.90 0.344 **2.09 
∆Market interest rate FR 0.162 1.47   0.972 ***38.82 
∆Market interest rate IT 0.744 ***3.34 0.312 ***3.68 0.146 1.28 
∆Market interest rate NL   0.099 **2.45 0.463 ***4.95 
∆Market interest rate PT     0.281 ***3.37 
∆Market interest rate*Boone-ind. (φ) 0.070 1.41 -0.033 **-2.47 0.020 0.92 
Residual AT (-1)   -0.004 **-2.16 -0.004 *-1.69 
Residual BE (-1) 0.001 0.31   -0.004 -1.58 
Residual DE (-1) -0.001 -0.80   -0.001 -0.64 
Residual ES (-1) -0.005 -1.51 -0.010 **-2.13 -0.006 **-2.03 
Residual FR (-1) -0.004 -1.36   0.000 0.24 
Residual IT (-1) -0.004 -1.33 -0.007 -1.41 -0.009 **-2.33 
Residual NL (-1)   -0.003 **-2.18 -0.005 -1.46 
Residual PT (-1)     -0.009 ***-3.39 
R-squared centred 0.27  0.18  0.63  
Number of observations 573  473  948  
Note: One, two and three asterisks indicate a level of confidence of, respectively, 90%, 95% and 99%. 
a See Equation (9.b). 
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7 Conclusions 
This paper analyses the effects of loan market competition on bank interest rates on 
loans and deposits, measuring competition by a new approach, called the Boone indicator. 
Our results show that, in the euro area countries, bank interest rate spreads on mortgage 
loans, consumer loans and short-term loans to enterprises are significantly lower in 
more competitive markets. This result implies that bank loan rates tend to be lower 
under heavier competition, thus improving social welfare. Banks compensate for stronger 
loan market competition by lowering their deposit rates. Furthermore, evidence is found 
for all four loan categories that, in the long run, bank loan rates are closer in line with 
market rates where competition is higher. These results show that stronger loan market 
competition reduces bank loan rates while changes in market rates are transmitted more 
rapidly to bank rates. These findings underline that bank competition may have a substantial 
impact on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
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APPENDIX: THE ESTIMATION OF THE BOONE INDICATOR MODEL 
Description of the data used 
The Boone indicator model uses Bankscope data of banks from eight euro area countries 
during 1992-2004.28 This model is based on marginal costs which are derived from a 
translog cost function with output components and input prices. In order to exclude irrelevant 
and unreliable observations, banks are incorporated in our sample only, if they fulfilled the 
following conditions: total assets, loans, deposits, equity and other non-interest income 
should be positive; the deposits-to-assets ratio and loans-to-assets ratio should be less 
than, respectively, 0.98 and 1; the income-to-assets ratio should be below 0.20; personnel 
expenses-to-assets and other expenses-to-assets ratios should be between 0.05% 
and 5%; and, finally, the equity-to-assets ratio should be between 0.01 and 0.50. As a result, 
our final data set totals 520 commercial banks, 1506 cooperative banks, 699 savings 
banks, 28 special governmental credit institutions (Landesbanken) and 62 real estate banks 
(see Table A.1). 
 
Table A.1 Number of banks by country and by type  
Country Commercial 
banks 
Cooperative 
banks 
Real 
estate 
banks 
Savings 
banks 
Specialized 
governmental 
credit 
institutions 
Total 
AT 52 54 10 65 0 181 
BE 24 6 0 5 0 35 
DE 130 867 44 501 28 1570 
ES 61 17 0 43 0 121 
FR 115 83 2 30 0 230 
IT 105 476 1 52 0 634 
NL 24 1 4 1 0 30 
PT 9 2 1 2 0 14 
Total 520 1506 62 699 28 2815 
 
Table A.2 provides a short description of the model variables. To grasp the relative 
magnitude of the key variables, such as costs, loans, security investment and other services, 
we present them as shares of corresponding balance sheet items. Total costs are defined as 
total expenses. They vary between 6.3% and 8.6% of total assets, whereas market shares 
in the loan market vary between 0.06% and 5.8%. Loans and securities are in the range of, 
respectively, 35%-60% and 4%-37% of total assets. One of the output components 
we distinguish is other services. For lack of direct observations, this variable is proxied by 
non-interest income. Non-interest income ranges from 12%-20% of total income. Wage rates 
are proxied as the ratio of personnel expenses and total assets, since for many banks the 
number of staff is not available. Wages vary across countries between 0.9% and 1.7% of total 
assets. The input price of capital is proxied by the ratio of other expenses and fixed assets. 
Finally, interest rates are proxied by dividing interest expenses by total funding and range 
from 3.2% to 5.9%. 
 
                                                                          
28. See also Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007), where a similar approach has been used. 
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Table A.2 Mean values of key variables for various countries (in %) 
 Boone 
model 
Translog cost function    
Country  
code 
Average 
loans 
market 
shares in 
% 
Total 
costs 
as % 
of 
total 
assets  
Loans as 
% of total 
assets 
Securities 
as % of 
total 
assets 
Other 
services 
as % of 
total 
income 
Other 
expenses 
as % of 
fixed 
assets 
Wages 
as % of 
total 
assets 
Interest 
expenses 
as % of 
total 
funding 
AT 0.87 6.34 56 22 20 229 1.4 3.2 
BE 2.27 6.49 35 37 16 594 1.0 4.5 
DE 0.06 6.44 60 22 12 227 1.5 3.7 
ES 0.98 6.63 58 14 16 167 1.5 4.1 
FR 0.41 7.42 54 4 20 537 1.5 4.8 
IT 0.22 6.67 53 26 16 261 1.7 3.5 
NL 3.02 6.59 54 15 13 340 0.9 5.4 
PT 5.83 8.62 52 8 18 191 1.3 5.9 
 
Estimation results for marginal costs 
We estimate a translog cost function for each separate country and take the first derivative of 
loans to derive the marginal costs of lending, see Equations (5) and (8), respectively.29 
Table A.3 shows the marginal costs of loans across countries and over time. Marginal costs 
decline over time, reflecting the significant decreases in funding rates during 1992-2004 and 
possibly also technological improvements. Germany, France and Spain have relatively high 
marginal costs compared to the Netherlands and Belgium. Apart from differences in funding 
rates, this may be explained also by lower efficiency in the former countries.30 
 
Table A.3 Marginal costs of loans across countries and over time (in %) 
 AT BE DE ES FR IT NL PT 
1992 10.3 7.1 10.2 15.9 13.8 13.2 9.2 21.3 
1993 9.4 6.9 9.4 17.2 13.4 12.0 8.1 18.8 
1994 7.1 6.4 9.2 14.3 11.9 12.2 7.4 16.6 
1995 7.3 5.8 8.9 15.4 11.7 11.8 7.1 15.4 
1996 7.1 5.2 8.5 14.3 10.9 11.3 6.3 13.4 
1997 6.1 4.6 7.4 11.7 10.9 9.7 6.4 12.3 
1998 6.0 3.6 7.1 11.1 11.2 7.5 7.4 9.4 
1999 5.5 3.2 6.4 8.8 10.0 6.7 6.4 6.1 
2000 6.1 3.3 7.1 9.9 11.2 6.7 6.5 6.3 
2001 6.1 3.1 7.3 9.6 11.7 6.6 6.4 5.9 
2002 5.7 3.1 7.1 7.8 10.7 6.1 5.7 5.2 
2003 5.5 2.7 6.4 5.9 8.9 5.3 4.9 5.3 
2004 5.2 2.5 6.0 4.8 7.9 4.9 4.6 5.5 
 
Estimation results for the Boone indicator  
Table A.4 shows the estimates of the Boone indicator across countries and over time 
(usually 1994-2004, depending on the respective country). The results are based on 
the following model: 
                                                                          
29. See also Section 3.1 in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). 
30. Another explanation is lower population density in the former countries. Low population density may raise operating 
costs, as it makes retail distribution of banking services more costly. 
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ln msi,t = α + ∑t=1,..,T βt ln mci,t + ∑t=1,..,(T-1) γt dt + ui,t  (A.1) 
 
explaining loans market shares of bank i in year t (msi,t) by marginal costs (mci,t) and country 
dummies (dt). Note that the Boone indicator, βt, is time dependent. The estimations are 
carried out using the Generalized Moment Method (GMM) with as instrument variables 
the one-, two- or three-year lagged values of the explanatory variable, marginal costs, or 
average costs. To test on overidentification of the instruments, we apply the Hansen J-test for 
GMM [Hayashi (2000)]. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid as such, i.e. 
uncorrelated with the error term. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is chi-squared 
with the number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentification restrictions. 
A rejection would cast doubt on the validity of the instruments. Furthermore, the Anderson 
canonical correlation likelihood ratio is used to test for the relevance of excluded instrument 
variables [Hayashi (2000)]. The null hypothesis of this test is that the matrix of reduced form 
coefficients has rank K-1, where K is the number of regressors, meaning that the equation is 
underidentified. Under the null hypothesis of underidentification, the statistic is chi-squared 
distributed with L-K+1 degrees of freedom, where L is the number of instruments (whether 
included in the equation or excluded). This statistic provides a measure of instrument 
relevance, and rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the model is identified. We use 
kernel-based heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance estimations. 
The bandwidth in the estimation is set at two periods and the Newey-West kernel is applied. 
Where the instruments are overidentified, 2SLS is used instead of GMM. For this 2SLS 
estimator, Sargan’s statistic is used instead of the Hansen J-test. 
Over the sample period, the Boone indicator for Belgium, Germany, and Italy 
are highly significant, except for one or two years, suggesting stronger loan market 
competition then elsewhere in the euro area.31 The Dutch and Spanish loan markets take up 
an intermediate position with significant Boone indicators for at least a number of years. 
For France, the degree of competition declined over the years, where the reverse 
development is observed for Austra and Portugal. If, for each country, we had estimated only 
one beta for the full-sample period instead of annual ones (that is, βt = β for all t), we would 
have obtained significant values for all countries (except Portugal), reflecting a certain degree 
of competition in the whole area [see Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007)]. 
 
                                                                          
31. Most likely, the favourable result for Germany hinges in part on the special structure of its banking system, 
being built on three pillars, i.e. the commercial banks, the publicly-owned savings banks and the cooperative banks 
[see Hackethal (2004)]. 
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Table A.4. The Boone indicator over time and across various countries2) 
  Germany1) France Italy1) 
 βt z-value βt z-value βt z-value 
1993     -5.90 -1.18 
1994     **-7.25 -3.24 
1995 -4.47 -1.40 **-1.28 -3.36 **-4.51 -3.53 
1996 **-7.09 -2.92 **-1.28 -3.56 **-5.58 -3.98 
1997 **-4.64 -3.41 **-1.11 -3.55 **-5.89 -4.08 
1998 **-5.10 -3.97 *-0.79 -1.99 **-4.60 -6.08 
1999 **-2.60 -4.04 *-0.7 -2.30 **-4.05 -4.39 
2000 **-2.50 -4.60 -0.46 -1.34 **-3.32 -4.39 
2001 **-3.31 -7.02 -0.68 -1.67 **-2.66 -3.62 
2002 **-4.53 -4.71 -0.40 -0.78 -1.59 -1.82 
2003 **-2.73 -5.62 0.27 0.39 **-2.42 -3.69 
2004 **-2.66 -4.15 0.10 0.12 **-1.81 -2.79 
F-test 10.70 5.01 13.23  
Anderson canon corr. LR-test 185.20 1023.66 300.34  
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.00  19.69 (0.48) 0.00   
Number of observations 14 534 918 4918  
  Spain1) Netherlands Belgium 
 βt z-value βt z-value βt z-value 
1993 *-4.21 -2.49     
1994 *-4.80 -2.28 -1.92 -1.42   
1995 -5.20 -1.92 *-4.42 -2.42 -1.48 -1.59 
1996 -9.61 -0.67 **-2.09 -2.58 **-1.74 -2.93 
1997 -4.36 -1.78 -3.57 -1.70 **-2.02 -3.78 
1998 -5.40 -0.86 1.04 0.38 **-1.98 -3.19 
1999 *-5.46 -2.21 -1.44 -0.85 **-2.62 -4.65 
2000 -3.44 -1.93 **-3.26 -3.00 **-3.41 -6.10 
2001 **-4.38 -2.55 **-3.91 -4.71 **-3.00 -4.51 
2002 *-3.88 -2.09 *-2.45 -2.44 **-3.42 -4.34 
2003 -3.42 -1.20 -2.22 -1.80 **-2.79 -3.18 
2004 **-2.69 -5.62 **-3.09 -2.85 **-3.12 -4.02 
F-test  3.33  3.90  6.35  
Anderson canon corr. LR-test 38.78  31.71  178.10  
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.00  20.5 (0.039)  8.34 (0.60)  
Number of observations 1015  241  269  
  Austria Portugal  
 βt z-value βt z-value  
1994 11.2 1.01 0.05 0.05   
1995 -4.03 -0.94 1.57 0.91  
1996 *-2.31 -1.93 0.09 0.16  
1997 4.25 0.93 -0.04 -0.08   
1998 -0.91 -0.52 -0.55 -0.76  
1999 -2.98 -0.73 -1.51 -1.40  
2000 -2.31 -0.50 **-2.43 -4.03   
2001 -0.96 -1.30 **-1.92 -3.77  
2002 *-1.49 -1.97 **-2.16 -7.33  
2003 **-1.26 -3.52 *-1.74 -2.05  
2004 **-2.99 -2.23 -1.53 -1.69  
F-test 2.21 3.94   
Anderson canon corr. LR-test 28.89 77.92   
Hansen J-test, (p-value) 9.308 (0.59) 11.71 (0.38)   
Number of observations 988 134   
 
Notes: Asterisks indicate 95% (*) and 99% (**) levels of confidence. Coefficients of time dummies have not 
been shown. 1) 2SLS is used and the equation is exactly identified, so that the Hansen J-test is 0.00. 2) 
Equation (A.1) is estimated with the GMM. 
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